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The Philosophy of Hume, as contained in extracts from the First Book and the First and Second Sections of the Third Part of the Second Book of the Treatise of Human Nature. Selected, with an introduction, by HERBERT AUSTIN AIKINS, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Trinity College, N.C., and Honorary Fellow of Clark University. [*Series of Modern Philosophers.* Edited by E. HERSHEY SNEATH, Ph.D.] New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1893. — pp. vi, 176.

The present volume is the sixth of the series of "Modern Philosophers." If one accept the idea of volumes of selections at all, a good deal is to be said for an attempt to present the philosophy of Hume in this form. It is by no means so plain as Dr. Aikin would have us believe that the standpoint of the *Enquiry* is essentially different from that of the *Treatise*, but the popular character of the former work makes it unsatisfactory for class use, while the first book of the *Treatise* is often found too long to be taken entire. Moreover, Hume's style is somewhat diffuse in the *Treatise*, which thus admits of considerable condensation. At the same time, the thread of the argument is by no means always easy to follow, and an epitome of the work is bound to be to a considerable extent, an interpretation.

The "Biographical Sketch" occupies only six pages, and consists mainly of quotations from Hume's own account of his life. The "Brief Exposition of Hume's Philosophy" occupies about eighteen pages. The first half of the exposition is taken up with a very compressed summary of the first book of the *Treatise*, while the rest is devoted to criticism. In each case a good deal has been attempted in a very little space, and the result can hardly be called satisfactory. Neither in the summary nor in the criticism is sufficient notice given to the fact that Hume merges the general question of causation in the particular question, "Why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects?" Moreover, Dr. Aikin's refutation of Hume's proof that logically reason should not be trusted is somewhat peculiar. "Granting that every judgment should be tested by another, and that each one would weaken the confidence reposed in that preceding it, it does not follow that all the original conviction would be finally destroyed; for in weakening the conviction attached to the second judgment, the third strengthens that belonging to the first: $1 - (\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{4}) = \frac{3}{4}$, not $\frac{1}{4}$, as Hume's argument supposes; and the sum of the series is two-thirds, not zero" (p. 47). Why not simply show, what is abundantly plain, that Hume's assumption of an indefinite regress here is gratuitous; that after the first judgment the question is, and remains, *Is reason to be relied upon or not?* and that the utter discrediting of reason by itself involves a logical absurdity. Other points might be mentioned, as, *e. g.*, the inadequate treatment of Hume's conflicting statements regarding the origin of impressions; but space forbids further criticism.

The selections themselves seem to have been made with good judgment, but of course the only adequate test of such a volume is actual use in class

and constant comparison with the original. In bulk the selections are only about one-third of the original, a material saving, if they prove satisfactory for class use. Since we have such an excellent cheap edition of the *Treatise* as that published by the Clarendon Press, would it not have been a good idea to indicate on the margin the pages of that edition where the selected passages are to be found? That would have enabled the interested student to keep in touch with the original with the least possible expenditure of labor, and would have had the further advantage of indicating the degree of condensation. The marginal page references in Professor Watson's *Philosophy of Kant*, which enable one to refer instantly to the original, are a prominent feature of that really helpful text-book. After all, a volume of selections is at best a necessary evil, and everything should be done to encourage the student to come into direct contact with the works of the philosopher whose system he is studying.

E. A.

Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Zum hundert-jährigen Jubiläum derselben herausgegeben von DR. HANS VAHINGER, a.o. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Halle. Band II, gr. 8vo, Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig, 1892. Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft. — pp. viii, 563.

Volume I appeared 1881-1882. It described, in an introduction of seventy pages, the historical and real significance of the K. d. r. V. as well as the relations between Dogmatism, Scepticism, and Criticism. The commentary was confined to the preface to the first edition and to the introduction (in the two versions). The second volume now before us is devoted again to only a small part of the *Kritik*, the *Æsthetic*, but is oftentimes not confined merely to the problems of this portion. For many of the principal questions which Vaihinger attempts to answer in independent discussions are of the greatest importance for the entire *Kritik*. The titles of these discussions are: The affecting objects, pp. 89-101: How is Kant's *A priori* related to the Innate? pp. 134-151: The possible views [with reference to the nature of space and time], pp. 253-261: Space as an infinite given quantity, pp. 275-286: Pure and applied mathematics, pp. 290-326: The controversy between Trendelenburg and Fischer, pp. 329-342; Methodological analysis of the Transcendental *Æsthetic*, pp. 422-436: The historical origin of Kant's doctrine of space and time, pp. 518-532: The paradox of symmetrical objects. These digressions are the most important and most interesting parts of the second volume. But the other less systematic expositions, although they often go too much into detail, are usually of great worth. They are characterized by penetrating and acute criticism and a wealth of judiciously handled historical material. The Commentary is an indispensable aid to every one who wishes to gain a scientific grasp of Kant's theoretical philosophy and will prove a source of fruitful suggestion.

E. ADICKES.