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"the action of our control centres than with our lower animal instincts. Through experience we learn, and habits being formed by individual repetition become innate." Professor Morgan reviews use-inheritance natural selection, sexual selection, the law of beauty, and conduct and verification with regard to psychogenesis. "Our nature," he says, "is intellectual, æsthetic, moral, and sensitive":

"The false is rejected as incongruous to our nature as intellectual; the ugly is avoided as incongruous to our nature as æsthetic; the wrong is shunned as incongruous to our nature as moral; so is the painful, so far as possible, avoided as incongruous to our nature as sensitive. . . . The guidance of pleasure and pain is of great importance—so great that some are found to argue that in moral matters we are influenced solely by considerations of happiness. . . . Only by extending the meaning of the words pleasure and pain so as to be coextensive with what I have here termed congruous and incongruous can it be said that our actions and our thoughts are determined by pleasure and pain." (London: Williams & Norgate.) κρσ.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

This is a new magazine which will be an additional proof that the philosophical interest in America is by no means so poor as the inhabitants of the old world generally suppose it to be. The character of the journal, it is to be expected, will be in harmony with the publications of its scholarly editor, Prof. J. G. Schurman, whose position is clearly set forth in a little volume of his "Belief in God," in which he conceives God in three ways (1) as the cause or ground of the world (2) as the realising purpose of the world, and (3) as the father of spirits.

Professor Watson reviews in an elaborate article Edward Caird's work "The Critical Philosophy of Emanuel Kant." "The philosophy of Kant," says Watson, "was accepted at first by submissive disciples, but it had afterwards to submit to a severe process of criticism which culminated in the Absolute Idealism of Hegel. The synthesis of Kant, as based upon an untenable opposition of the phenomenal and the real, was weighed and found wanting. . . . We must be grateful to any one who helps us, not merely to see Kant, but to see beyond him. This is the task which Professor Caird, in his exhaustive work on the Critical Philosophy, has set

himself to perform," and adds Watson, "he has done it in a way that leaves nothing to be desired."

Professor Ladd criticises Professor James's Psychology as so-called natural science.

"What we wish to have in the name of cerebral psychology, is a description, in terms of a comprehensible theory of molecular physics; and, also, a statement of the formulæ which define the relations between the molecular changes and the 'corresponding' orders of mental phenomena. But this is precisely what Professor James avoids doing, even to the extent which so-called 'nerve-physiology' makes possible. And, nothing worthy of the name 'science' is possible for any one in this branch of cerebral psycho-physics."

Professor James replies to the criticism in the second number of *The Philosophical Review*. He says:

"Psychology is to-day hardly more than what physics was before Galileo, what chemistry was before Lavoisier. It is a mass of phenomenal description, gossip, and myth, including, however, real material enough to justify one in the hope that its study may become worthy of the name of natural science at no very distant day. I wished, by treating Psychology *like* a natural science, to help her to become one."

Professor Ladd is a transcendentalist and Professor James has great expectations of the work inaugurated by the Society for Psychical Research.

Theoretically they stand much nearer than practically, as well indicated by Professor James's remark:

"In Professor Ladd's own book on 'Physiological Psychology,' that 'real being, proceeding to unfold powers that are *sui generis*, according to laws of its own,' for whose recognition he contends, plays no organic part in the work, and has proved a mere stumbling block to his biological reviewers."

He adds in a footnote:

"I mean that such a being is quite barren of particular consequences. Its character is only known by its reactions on the signals which the nervous system gives, and these must be gathered by observation after the fact. If only it were subject to successive reincarnations, as the theosophists say it is, so that we might guess what sort of a body it would unite with next, or what sort of persons it had helped to constitute previously, those would be great points gained. But even those gains are denied us; and the real being is, for practical purposes, an entire superfluity, which a *practical* psychology can perfectly well do without."

Andrew Seth, the well-known coryphæus of philosophy and psychology at Edinburgh, presses the importance of distinguishing the different standpoints of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. Locke, Berkeley, Hume and other English as well as Continental thinkers "speak sometimes from one point of view, sometimes from the other without being aware that the two points of view are different."

"Psychology, assuming the existence of a subject or medium of consciousness, seeks to explain, mainly by the help of association or processes practically similar, how out of the come-and-go of conscious states, there are evolved such subjective facts as perceptions, the belief in an independent real world, and the idea of the Ego or subject himself. . . . Metaphysics has to do with the ultimate nature of the reality which reveals itself alike in the consciousness which knows and the world which is known. . . . The epistemological thing-in-itself to be identified with the metaphysical essence. . . . The problem of knowledge and the Real, is the question which Epistemology has to face." (Boston, New York, Chicago: Ginn & Co.) *κρς.*